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This paper examines the economic, as 
well as other, levels of interaction and 
ties between Pakistan and the states, 
economies, and societies of the Gulf Co-
operation Council or GCC.1 The relevance 
of this subject lies not so much in the 
overall discussion of so-called South-
South cooperation as it does with the 
spaces and dynamics that might shape 
the fledgling multi-polar world order. 
These ties and relations are nothing new. 
Historically, interaction and economic 
and ideological ties between what are 
now the GCC countries—which were 
established as modern nation-states be-
tween 1927 and 1971 and whose politi-
cal regimes are all hereditary autocra-
cies—and the state of Pakistan—
which was founded in 1947 and has a 
republican system—have been in
 existence since the pre-modern era.  
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Key Points 
 
The multi-faceted interaction between Paki-
stan and the GCC, in which much revolves 
around the country’s ties with Saudi Arabia, 
is not merely geopolitical and formal-
economic, but has also a strong grassroots 
dimension through labor migration and pil-
grimage. 
 
The close alliances that exist between part of 
the Pakistani and especially the GCC’s estab-
lishments with the US as the neo-imperial 
core, are all but uncontested both inside 
their respective societies and elites. The out-
come of this smouldering conflict will de-
termine whether the ‘axis of complementari-
ty’ between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could 
emerge as a center in the multi-polar world 
order. 
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Sea traffic and coastal trade between the 
Makran coast, Oman, and the Gulf, for exam-
ple, has existed in one form or another for 
centuries.2 And the integration of the Makran 
coast, Multan, and Sind in the eastern frontier 
of the Islamic sphere and the caliphs by the 
year 713 did not only implant Islam on the 
subcontinent, but thus also created a common 
denominator among the different social and 
ideological identities that has survived until 
present day. 
 
The defense symbiosis 
 
Much of Pakistan’s interaction with the Per-
sian-Arabian Gulf revolves around its multi-
dimensional ties with the GCC’s core state, 
Saudi Arabia. Pakistan has the peculiar dis-
tinction of being one of the few modern states 
that has been specifically founded for a reli-
giously defined community—in this case for 
South Asia’s Muslim population—while Saudi 
Arabia, by far the GCC’s geographically, demo-
graphically, and economically largest mem-
ber, has since its founding been the self-
declared guardian and site of Mecca and Me-
dina, the Muslim Ummah’s holy centers. The 
latter is not an unimportant factor, since Paki-
stan, through the size of its population and its 
confessional geography, reflects well the reali-
ty that the demographic center of gravity of 
the Ummah has long shifted from the Arab 
sphere eastward.  
 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia also have a tradi-
tion of close military cooperation. The state of 
Pakistan, the backbone of which is the mili-
tary, has been providing military aid to Saudi 
Arabia for decades, starting with assistance in 
training its air force in 1961 and the provision 
of air raid support against an incursion by 
socialist South Yemen in 1969. Since then, 
varying numbers of Pakistani military per-
sonnel have been stationed, in one capacity or 
another, in Saudi Arabia. During the First Gulf 
War (1990-91), Pakistan sent troops to pro-
tect Mecca and Medina while Saudi Arabia has 
also been providing various forms of support 
to Pakistan’s nuclear program since 1979-80, 
and provided favorable oil supplies and loans 
to help it cope with the financial costs of its 
nuclear program and the economic sanctions 
imposed in the aftermath of its nuclear test in 
1998. More recently, since late 2001-3, mili-
tary cooperation has been pursued within the 
framework of “anti-terrorism,” although the 
latter, in Saudi Arabia as in other GCC states, 
is often used to justify containing internal 
dissent in general.3  
 
Military cooperation has a sizeable economic 
dimension since business activities in sectors 
as various as agro-industry, transport and 
communications, banking and energy are re-
lated to or initiated by groups and individuals 
from Pakistan’s defense sector, which alleged-
ly accounts for approximately 25 percent of 
the country’s de facto gross domestic product. 
Companies embedded in networks of military 
or former military personnel are also active in 
the trade between Pakistan and the GCC coun-
tries.4 Finally, the military sectors of Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia, as well as several other GCC 
states, are traditionally major Anglo-American 
clients, both in terms of arms and equipment 
purchases as well as aid. Just as the elites of 
the GCC states consider extraneous military 
protection and suppliers crucial to their sur-
vival, the U.S. considers all these states to be 
vital to its security strategy. While originally, 
until 1988-91, this strategy sought to contain 
socialism, since 1997-2001 the issues of ter-
rorism, emerging powers, and energy poli-
cy—four GCC countries are OPEC members—
have formed the basis of the U.S. engagement 
in the Arab and wider Islamic world.5  
 
Oil, land, and free-trade agreements 
 
Since 1973, the privileged military ties be-
tween the U.S., Saudi Arabia and other GCC oil 
exporters have been one of the core compo-
nents of the petrodollar system, which also 
applies to the energy trade between the GCC 
sphere and Pakistan. This brings us to the 
second level of interaction—that is, the inter-
national trade and investment streams be-
tween the GCC economies and Pakistan. In 
2011, total Pakistan-GCC trade officially stood 
at some $18 billion of which $15 billion was 
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comprised of imports from, and $3 billion 
exports to, the GCC. If one looks at Graph 1, 
one immediately notices that in terms of im-
ports, the GCC, as an economic bloc, formed 
by far the largest single trade partner of Paki-
stan in 2011. Almost all of Pakistan’s trade 
with the GCC bloc is, in order of magnitude, 
with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi 
Arabia, and Kuwait. As one can rather easily 
guess, this is largely because of Pakistan’s 
energy sector’s dependency on petroleum 
imports from the GCC, of which the near-
totality comes from these three oil-exporting 
countries.  
 
Pakistan has been trying over the years to 
diminish its dependency on GCC oil through 
the partial reorientation of its energy supplies 
to natural gas and plans to import gas by 
pipeline from Iran by 2015. Other projects 
include prospecting and developing its do-
mestic natural gas reserves in Sui and Makran 
as well as its coal and oil fields in the Thar 
Desert, and by upgrading the new port in 
Gwadar for the planned import of natural gas 
and coal from other regions. Pakistan’s ex-
ports to the GCC are mostly composed of agro-
industrial products, food, and textiles, while 
its main export commodities—raw cotton, 
sugar cane, and other agro-industrial com-
modities—are largely directed to the U.S. and 
European markets. The GCC’s share as an ex-
port market for Pakistan has been shrinking 
slightly in recent years, which results, as seen 
in Graph 1, in a highly unequal trade balance.  
 
Direct foreign investment from the GCC bloc 
to Pakistan comes predominantly from the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. Over 
the last fifteen years, business groups and 
companies from the GCC bloc have benefited 
from Pakistan's efforts at privatization in the 
telecommunications and finance sectors, and 
have also invested in real estate, oil infra-
structure, transport, and the steel industry. 
The latter is a sector in which the family of 
Pakistan’s current prime minister, Nawaz 
Sharif, who was in exile in Saudi Arabia be-
tween late 2000 and 2007, has assets and 
interests. 6 Of the GCC countries, the UAE was 
the largest individual provider of FDI to Paki-
stan with a total of $3.5 billion invested dur-
ing the period 2000-09. By comparison, the 
U.S. provided $4.8 billion while $646.8 million 
came from Saudi Arabia during the same pe-
riod.7  
 
Graph 1. The position of the GCC countries 
in Pakistan’s overall foreign trade in 2011 
(in millions of $), and breakdown by GCC 
country (in % share of total)8  
 
 
 
Since 2002 and especially after the global food 
commodity price spikes in 2008, an increas-
ing interest and activity can be observed in 
terms of FDI flows from the GCC towards the 
Pakistani agro-industrial sector (especially 
the dairy and fruit branches, fisheries, and 
livestock) and related infrastructure.9 This fits 
in with the trend in which food imports to the 
GCC, which amount already to 90 percent of 
the region’s needs, are foreseen to double 
from $27.5 to $53.1 billion between 2011 and 
2020. The food security strategy for the GCC 
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also involves some African countries with 
historical and cultural ties to the Arabian Pen-
insula.10 GCC actors are confronted in this 
field with similar interests from Chinese, 
Southeast Asian, and European groups and 
companies.  
 
This certainly boosts the agro-industrial sec-
tor in Pakistan; but the ensuing competition 
for access to land also steadily exacerbates 
social tensions and fault lines in a country 
where agriculture employs 43 percent of the 
labor force. Indeed, the real and perceived 
practice of land grabs mainly benefits the neo-
feudal landowner elites to the detriment of 
family-based agriculture and fisheries. 
 
Since 2006, the GCC has sought to push 
through a free trade agreement with Pakistan. 
Such an agreement is to theoretically boost 
the volume of trade between Pakistan and the 
GCC up to $350 billion by 2020. The actual 
agenda, is however, perceived to be particu-
larly driven by the interests of Qatar. As one 
of the world’s major exporters of natural gas 
and, as such, heavily concerned by Pakistan’s 
intentions to import gas from Iran, the ra-
tionale for such a free trade agreement is to 
anchor and deepen Pakistan’s energy de-
pendency on the GCC including in the non-oil 
sector.   
 
Members of the Pakistani power and business 
elites have also invested in real estate and in 
the service industries in the Persian-Arabian 
Gulf’s hub cities and so-called economic free 
zones, and often possess bank accounts in 
Bahrain. The latter’s status as a tax haven for 
the wealthy explains, along with Iran’s per-
ceived role in the events in the majority Shi’ite 
but Sunni-ruled kingdom, why the uprising in 
early 2011 was suppressed, for now at least, 
with the help of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 
other outside actors, including Pakistan. The 
latter did not happen through open and direct 
military intervention, as was the case with 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but rather occurred 
through the recruitment of up to some two 
thousand Pakistani personnel and advisors 
for Bahrain’s national guard and riot police; 
these were recruited through so-called pri-
vate security contractors from wider business 
circles connected to the Pakistan military. 
Many of the recruits are allegedly retired mili-
tary and police officers from the Makran re-
gion.11 
 
Labor migration and the remittance econ-
omy 
 
They form, however, but a niche segment in 
what is an enormous sphere of labor migra-
tion between Pakistan and the GCC. As can 
clearly be seen from Graph 2 below, the GCC 
countries—and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 
particular—are by far the most significant 
destination for Pakistani labor migrants and 
expatriates in the world. In 2012, nearly 3.4 
million Pakistani migrants, mainly men, lived 
and worked in the GCC countries at least on a 
seasonal basis. At first glance, this is easy to 
explain by the stark demographic and eco-
nomic misbalance between Pakistan and the 
GCC. In 2012, the GCC sphere had a total pop-
ulation of 43.3 million of which Saudi Arabia 
accounted for nearly two-thirds, whereas the 
population of Pakistan was 175.3 million, or 
over four times that of the GCC’s population. 
Similarly, while the GDP per capita was 
$2,792 in Pakistan in 2012, the average in the 
GCC countries was $44,987.12 Such discrepan-
cies, however, fail to explain the scope of 
these migration patterns. 
 
As previously said, trade, transport, and mi-
gration ties between southern Pakistan and 
the GCC countries, Oman in particular, have 
been in existence for centuries, and several 
population groups in Oman and Saudi Arabia 
claim ancestry from regions that are now in 
present-day Pakistan. Thus, networks and 
niche presences that were later to become 
instrumental in modern labor migration al-
ready existed. It was, however, not until 1980 
that such sizeable migration and expatriation 
from Pakistan to the GCC area occurred. The 
oil boom of 1971-73 initially attracted labor 
migrants from Arab countries outside of the 
GCC. After 1980, growing labor demand, a 
native GCC population that is culturally less 
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inclined to engage in the specific occupations 
needed, and a Pakistani foreign policy that 
increasingly leaned towards the Persian-
Arabian Gulf, all culminated in a second immi-
gration wave in which Pakistani workers 
were very prominent.13 
 
Another landmark event in this process came 
after the First Gulf War when Saudi Arabia 
and other GCC countries decided to turn 
eastward to Pakistan and other countries to 
fulfill their labor demands, and so replace 
those Palestinians and other Arabs who had 
been supportive of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and 
were as such perceived to be a security 
threat.14  
 
Graph 2. The GCC sphere in the regional 
distribution of the Pakistani diaspora in 
2012 or the last available year (in millions 
of migrants and expatriates), and break-
down by GCC state (in % share of total)15 
 
 
 
 
Finally, between 1997 and 2001, the decision 
by several GCC governments to diversify and 
modernize their oil- and trade-based econo-
mies and the high oil prices led to a rapid 
surge in development activity, a 259 percent 
regional GDP growth between 1998 and 2008, 
as well as a peak in labor demand. The pro-
portion of labor migrants (of all nationalities) 
in the GCC’s active population now ranges 
from over 30 percent in Saudi Arabia to over 
90 percent in the UAE and Qatar.16  
 
Pakistani migrants in the GCC are primarily 
employed in construction. The GCC region’s 
modern metropolises and, more recently, the 
towering skyscrapers, infrastructure, and 
international elite developments (malls, 
apartments, gated communities, golf courses 
and other leisure facilities…) in Dubai and 
Abu Dhabi are in no small part built employ-
ing Pakistani labor. Other sectors in which 
Pakistanis are well-represented are all sorts 
of maintenance (mechanic workshops, gar-
dening…), small- and medium-scale trade, as 
well as the taxi industry and other transport 
activities. As such, as one can see in Graph 3, 
the GCC economies form by far the largest 
source of remittances to Pakistan, followed 
far behind by continental Europe and the UK.  
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In 2012, a recorded $13.18 billion in remit-
tances, representing 5 to 7 percent of the 
country’s GDP, were sent to Pakistan. Of this, 
46 percent came from Saudi Arabia, 36 per-
cent from the UAE (more specifically 18 per-
cent from Dubai and 17 percent from Abu 
Dhabi), 7 percent from Kuwait, and 11 per-
cent from the three other GCC states.17 The 
remittance economy has created a substantial 
network of both official and informal financial 
transfer channels and services between the 
GCC and Pakistan.18  
 
The official number of Pakistani expatriates in 
the region make up for only about two per-
cent of Pakistan’s total population, yet their 
remittances to the country constitute an im-
portant financial lifeline for those in their 
places and areas of origin, much more than 
international aid does. As is the case in other 
receiving societies, the impact of remittance 
flows is mixed and depends in large part on 
the social psychology of the individuals and 
communities involved. They are certainly 
productively invested and help to ease pov-
erty. Indeed, the remittances from the GCC 
and elsewhere have played a considerable 
role in alleviating and helping Pakistanis cope 
with the economic setbacks brought about by 
the earthquake in north-west in late 2005, the 
military offensive in Swat in spring 2009, and 
the floods in summer 2010.19 However, remit-
tances generally speaking can also cause 
handout dependency, consumerism, as well as 
deindustrialization and agricultural decline.20  
 
 
Graph 3. The GCC economies in the regional origin of remittances to Pakistan in the fiscal 
years from 1999 to 2012 (in million $)21
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The political economy of hearts and minds 
 
A channel of interaction and an economic tie 
that is specifically embedded in the confes-
sional geography shared between Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and the Ummah in general, is 
what one could call the “pilgrimage industry” 
to Mecca and Medina. The number of pilgrims 
(or at least pilgrimage-related entries) be-
tween 2000 and 2012 is estimated at more 
than 30 million, of which more than two-
thirds came from outside of Saudi Arabia. The 
economic and cultural dimension of this is far 
from negligible. Saudi Arabia’s direct and in-
direct annual revenue from organizing and 
hosting the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages (in-
cluding permits and taxes, transport, accom-
modation, and food) is estimated to be be-
tween $10 and $30 billion depending on the 
year and the source consulted. Indeed, pil-
grimage revenues are the country’s second-
largest source of income after the hydrocar-
bon industry.22 In 2012, Pakistan, with an 
official share of 11.7 percent of foreigners 
who performed the Hajj that year, was the 
second-largest source of pilgrims to Mecca 
and Medina after Egypt with 14.9 percent. 
According to official Hajj statistics, Pakistan 
also occupied second place in 2011 and has 
been consistently a major sender of pilgrims 
for many years.23 
 
The confessional ties also raise the controver-
sial issue of Saud Arabia’s and Kuwait’s “ideo-
logical exports” to Pakistan, which are con-
ducted through private foundations as well as 
quasi-governmental structures, and their role 
in the growth of a Wahhabi and especially 
Salafi Sunni societal segment there.24 In Paki-
stan as elsewhere, social identities traditional-
ly dominated by more syncretic Sufi beliefs 
and practices have come under pressure be-
cause of the impact of globalization, social 
mobility, migration, urbanization, as well as 
the discrediting of some Sufi elites on account 
of their close association with unpopular po-
litical elites. This has created ground, in cer-
tain sectors of Pakistani society, for more or-
thodox and puritanical interpretations and 
practices of Islam. One of these is Salafism, to 
which an estimated 5 to 7 percent of the coun-
try’s Islamic followers are now believed to 
adhere to or be influenced by.  
 
Since 1978-81, Saudi Arabia, in particular, has 
been funding the construction of mosques—
including the enormous landmark Faisal 
mosque in Islamabad—and various forms of 
religious education as well as some religious 
movements and political parties. The latter 
include the Salafi Ahl-i-Hadith (“People of the 
tradition of the Prophet”) movement and its 
political wing. These ties are not recent and 
can be traced back to 1927, when Ahl-i-Hadith 
representatives from what is now Pakistan 
travelled to the Kingdom of Nejd and Hejaz, 
the predecessor state of Saudi Arabia. More 
steady practical support from Saudi Arabia 
and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait, to the Ahl-i-
Hadith and similar political-religious organi-
zations in Pakistan started after the Arab-
Israeli war of 1973 and especially in the wake 
of Pakistan’s foreign policy turn to the Per-
sian-Arabian Gulf after 1980. 25  The Ahl-i-
Hadith nowadays runs or controls 17 social 
and political organizations and an estimated 
400 Quranic schools in the country.  
 
The above represents only 4 percent of the 
registered total of such schools. However, 
compared to the 47 Quranic schools affiliated 
to the movement in 1971 and 161 in 1988, it 
has clearly been a growing niche.26 The popu-
lation of Pakistan can also watch religious 
satellite channels from the Persian-Arabian 
Gulf, some of which broadcast Salafi and 
Wahhabi content. In general, Salafism is more 
present in urban centers and parts of the 
country that are relatively more affluent be-
cause, among other reasons, they are subject 
to a strong influx of remittances from the GCC 
region. Although much of the Salafi Ahl-i-
Hadith movement is not involved in armed 
struggle, the existence of militant groups in-
spired by Salafism and the fact that these con-
sider Sufis and the large Shi’ite minority to be 
heretics, mean that their presence is per-
ceived to be a societal threat by various opin-
ion leaders, some governmental elites and 
competing Islamic groups.  
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Labor migration and confessional interactions 
through pilgrimages ensure the presence of 
the GCC region, and of Saudi Arabia in particu-
lar, in the consciousness of the Pakistani pop-
ulation. Despite the often harsh and exploita-
tive working conditions and social segrega-
tion to which labor migrants are exposed and 
despite the decadent lifestyles of part of the 
region’s elites and of the wealthy expatriates 
who have settled in Dubai and other hubs, 
opinion in Pakistan generally seems to hold a 
favorable view of Saudi Arabia especially. 
Although opinion polls only suggest one as-
pect of the reality, according to a 2008 survey 
no less than 97 percent of respondents were 
to some extent favorably disposed to Saudi 
Arabia. For Iran this figure was 67 percent 
while the non-GCC Arab countries included in 
the questionnaire lagged far behind with an 
“approval” rate of between 33 and 39 percent.  
 
By contrast, the U.S. was rated favorably by 
only 19 percent of respondents.27 Of course, 
this does not necessarily reflect a popular 
endorsement of the GCC region’s political re-
gimes and power elites, but rather reflects 
positive associations with employment and 
income opportunities, and with Mecca,       
Medina, and the Hajj. This author’s anecdotal 
evidence and impressions gathered in Paki-
stan suggest much more mixed popular feel-
ings, which vary according to personal expe-
riences and the vicissitudes of international 
affairs.28 
  
Also worthy of note is the provision of hu-
manitarian aid to and development coopera-
tion from the GCC region with Pakistan. Here 
again, the most prominent interaction is that 
between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and, to a 
lesser extent, the UAE and Kuwait. Saudi Ara-
bia’s semi-governmental aid body al-Igata, 
which is better known as the International 
Islamic Relief Organization, has been operat-
ing in Pakistan almost continuously since 
1982.29 Kuwait’s International Islamic Charity 
Organization and various semi-governmental 
and private charities from the UAE and Qatar 
have also been present in the country since 
1989-99. As Graph 4 illustrates, in terms of 
registered humanitarian assistance between 
1999 and 2013, Saudi Arabia and the other 
GCC countries formed the fourth-largest do-
nor sphere to Pakistan after the U.S., the EU 
(both as an institution and through its indi-
vidual member states), and private donors, 
who include individuals, organizations, and 
companies in the affected country and beyond. 
 
Graph 4. The GCC countries among donors of humanitarian aid to Pakistan between 1999 and 
2013 (in million $), and among providers of development grants and loans between 2004 
and 2009 (in % share)30  
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In a number of specific crises like the floods in 
the summer of 2010, the contributions of 
Saudi Arabia were much more prominent. 
Contributing $242.2 million in effectively dis-
bursed aid, it was the third-largest donor after 
the U.S. with $631.7 million; $247.5 million 
came from private donors. However, if we add 
the $96 million from the five other GCC coun-
tries—of which $77 million came from the 
UAE and $9.25 million from Kuwait—the GCC 
as a bloc provided a total of $338.2 million in 
relief aid during the 2010 floods.31 If one 
looks at Graph 4 again, we see that in terms of 
development grants that were allocated to 
Pakistan in the period between 2004 and 
2009, Saudi Arabia was Pakistan’s second-
largest donor after the U.S. The grants have 
been especially directed at post-disaster and 
post-conflict reconstruction and at social and 
economic infrastructure development. Often 
they are intended to facilitate later economic 
investment.32 They are either disbursed bilat-
erally or through the Islamic Development 
Bank of which Saudi Arabia is by far the larg-
est shareholder. Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
states also contribute to the activities of spe-
cialized UN organizations in Pakistan. 
 
GCC development aid to Pakistan, in which 
besides Saudi Arabia the UAE and Kuwait also 
play a prominent role, is erratic and deter-
mined to a large extent by major events such 
as the earthquake in north-western Pakistan, 
the Swat offensive, the floods of 2010, and the 
energy crisis.33 The major sources of loans to 
Pakistan are not the GCC but international 
financial institutions and development banks 
in which the U.S. plays a key role or at least 
wields considerable influence. The GCC’s 
share here does not exceed 5 percent, the 
input of the Islamic Development Bank in-
cluded. The “classical” international financial 
institutions’ and development banks’ activi-
ties in Pakistan have strongly increased since 
the country became a frontline state in the so-
called war on terror and in the wake of vari-
ous natural disasters and the energy crisis the 
country has been coping with since 2007.34 
Critics however consider such a “buy-off” of 
Pakistan’s establishment into cooperation 
with extraneous geopolitical agendas and the 
increasing debt and adverse loan conditions 
to be nefarious for the country and its society. 
Last but not least, remittances, as previously 
examined, can be considered as an alternative 
channel of aid, and have a much more direct 
impact at the grassroots level in terms of cop-
ing and investment capacity than official de-
velopment assistance does.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The interaction between the Pakistan and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries is multi-
faceted and occurs along a geopolitical and 
social grassroots interface on account of the 
confessional dimension and labor migration. 
The question is whether this South-South 
relationship is one of interdependency, or one 
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between a core of high-income oil-producing 
GCC countries and a periphery formed by the 
more agricultural, lower middle-income coun-
try of Pakistan? At first glance, Pakistan would 
appear to be a source of ‘mercenaries’, cheap 
labor, and cultivable land for the GCC coun-
tries. This is also how some opinion makers in 
Pakistan’s media, intelligentsia and politics 
describe it. The financial aid, advantageous oil 
deliveries, and remittances from Saudi Arabia 
and other GCC countries definitely are of 
enormous importance for Pakistan—if not for 
its survival at least in order for it to function. 
It means however that it is also vulnerable to 
economic downturn and political unrest in the 
Persian-Arabian Gulf. The power elites of Pa-
kistan thus have a vested interest in helping 
to ensure the continuity and stability of the 
Saudi regime as well as the regimes of the 
other GCC countries.  
 
Accordingly, Pakistan is neither completely 
nor typically peripheral in this regard. Indeed, 
it possesses greater military strength and 
experience as well as has more diverse indus-
tries than the GCC countries. It also produces 
military hardware and provides defense ex-
pertise to Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, 
as well as has the distinction of being the 
world’s only Islamic nuclear power so far. Its 
potential may well be stunted due to setbacks 
such as natural disasters, and to political fac-
tors, but it is not a fully-fledged or completely 
passive periphery. Rather what can be ob-
served is an interaction between semi-
peripheries, an interaction that is defined and 
carried by a confluence of historical factors, 
security paradigms or perceived paradigms, 
and by economic geography. Once more, 
much revolves around the ties between Paki-
stan and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the UAE, with 
whom ties are of a more economic nature, 
those with the Saudi kingdom are highly polit-
ical and ideological.  
 
Pakistan along with the rulers of Saudi Arabia 
and the other GCC states have also been 
longstanding U.S. allies, and, thus, beneficiar-
ies of considerable strategic dividends, in the 
containment of Soviet as well as Baathist so-
cialism until 1991, against Iran since 1979, 
and more recently, since 2001, in the fight 
against the much more vague and ubiquitous 
‘terrorist threat.’ Pakistan is also a major re-
cipient of aid from both the U.S. and from the 
international financial institutions that it con-
trols. All this raises the ire of a not insubstan-
tial number of people, both in Pakistan and in 
the Persian-Arabian Gulf, who feel that this 
serves a neo-imperial agenda of control over 
the Ummah, its scared sites and its resources, 
and one that is against the very Islamic char-
acter and destiny of both Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia.35  The channels and networks that 
exist between Pakistan and the Persian-
Arabian Gulf, are also used by groups and 
individuals who contest the present world 
order and the role of their incumbent political 
and economic elites therein. The way and 
nature of changes that might sooner or later 
occur in the world order as well as in Saudi 
Arabia’s and Pakistan’s ruling elites will de-
termine whether the current axis of comple-
mentarity that exists between the two coun-
tries might yet become the backbone of some 
sort of “Islamic Union.”  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC,  نواعتلا سلجم
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